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Adam Smith and the History of Economic Thought: the Case of Banking
Forthcoming in The Princeton Guide to Adam Smith, edited by Ryan Hanley

Maria Pia Paganelli
Adam Smith’s analysis of banking is often studied as part of the history of banking in Scotland, of
free banking, or of the Real Bill doctrine debate i (e.g.: Checkland 1975b; Munn 1981; Glasner 1985;
Selgin 1989; Glasner 1992; Gherity 1994; White [1994] 1995; Arnon 2011; Rockoff 2011; Rockoff
2013)— topics that are not part of traditional mainstream economic doctrines. It is seldom centerstage in the Smith scholarship. Banking in Smith’s thought is also mentioned, but not generally
analyzed in depth, in Smith’s analysis of the relation between free market and state intervention ii
(e.g.: Viner 1927; Stigler 1971). Smith believes in the free market, but he also supports banking
regulations that would seem to violate that same ‘natural liberty’ associated with free markets.
I suggest that there is more in Smith’s analysis of banking than an historical account of free banking
in Scotland and than a contribution to a technical issue of economic theory. When historians of
economics look at Smith on banking and focus only on the historical or technical aspects of Smith,
they often narrow the focus, often narrowing (or losing) the picture of the bigger project Smith
seems to envision, generating what seem like contradictions in Smith’s thought. I suggest instead
that Smith’s analysis of banking is a reflection of Smith’s bigger picture of society iii (e.g.: Buchanan
1978; Evensky 2005)—the banking systems that Smith describes, like markets, through a complex
web of relationships, create efficiency and are able to develop and support moral social life—
resolving, at least in part, some of the tensions presented by the literature regarding otherwise
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puzzling calls for regulations and state interventions in an economy which should be self-regulating
instead iv (e.g.: Viner 1927; Stigler 1971; Billet 1978).
According to Smith banks should be allowed to issue their own money and compete in a minimally
regulated environment. On the one hand, competition, including the possibility of bank failures,
generates discipline, and discipline generates prudent behavior. On the other hand, competition in
the banking sector is generated and maintained by prudent behavior. The prudent behavior of
morally responsible banks is rewarded with economic success and it supports the economic and
moral development of society; and the economic success of banks allows for morals to flourish.
In recent years there is an increasing number of calls for a more integrated view of economics in
general v (Smith 2008; Wagner 2012) and of Adam Smith in particular (Paganelli forthcoming) vi
(Paganelli forthcoming). Markets are powerful promoters of social wellbeing but they cannot be
conceived outside their legal and moral framework. Laws and regulations if enlightened and
designed with communal wellbeing in mind (a heroic assumption, granted, as Smith was well aware),
enhances the powers of the market. If not, they can destroy the benefits originating from the
market. Banking is, like any other parts of Smith’s analysis, an integral part of a complex web of
entangled relationships between the economy, the polity, laws, and morals—an example of the
complexity of the natural system of liberty which promotes prosperity and the development of
moral, free, and responsible individuals. And if banking is an example of how symbiotic individuals,
society, morals, the market, and its legal framework are for Smith, state regulation and self-regulation
may no longer be in contradiction.
If we see that for Smith wealth develops in conjunction with morals and justice, we can appreciate
his commitment to both free banking and banking regulations. Given the multiplicity of individuals
in society, it is possible that some have conflicting goals. As a result there will be times when some
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individuals may benefit at the expense of the majority of members of their communities, and other
times when the majority of members of a community may benefit at the expense of some minority
of individuals vii (Paganelli 2009). In cases where there are conflicting interests, Smith tends to side
with the one which makes the majority of the individuals better off. David Levy viii (1995) describes
Smith as a median utilitarian, that is to say that one of Smith’s major concerns is the wellbeing of the
median, of the majority of the population.
Smith favors the formal and informal institutional arrangements which align the interest of
individuals with the interest of society and which allow society to prosper peacefully and ethically.
Competition, morals, the rule of law, and, occasionally, regulation, are part of these formal and
informal institutional arrangements. In this light, we may understand Smith’s position on banking.
The competition of free banking enhances the majority of the people both materially and morally,
and if some regulations are needed to support the smooth functioning of the banking system, those
regulations are welcomed. On the other hand, if some banking regulations favor some at the
expense of the majority, therefore inhibiting material growth and incentivizing immoral behaviors,
those regulations are, in Smith’s view, to be criticized and hopefully avoided. Using the vision that
historians of economics recognize in Smith also for understanding Smith’s views of banks may help
us not only using a more coherent method of analysis of Smith, but also decrease some of the
contradictions allegedly attributed to Smith.

Smith and Banking.
The banking system that Smith describes consists of several competing banks, each issuing their
own notes: “It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money upon them
3

before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers issue their promissory notes” (WN
II.ii.43, p. 298) and “[by] invent[ing] ... another method of issuing their promissory notes; by
granting, what they call, cash accounts, that is by giving credit to the extent of a certain sum ... to any
individual who could procure two persons of undoubted credit and good landed estate to become
surety for him, that whatever money should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit
had been given, should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest” (WN II.ii.44, p.
299).
In stark contrast to David Hume, who wishes the abolition of banks and paper money ix (Paganelli
2013b), Smith sees banks and banking as institutions that facilitate economic development, and
therefore the material wellbeing of the majority of people, while at the same time improving the
moral behavior of individuals by encouraging individual responsibility. We could speculate that
Smith may actually care more about presenting this vision than a meticulous description of reality x
(see also: Hueckel 2009): Smith’s analysis of the Scottish banking system seems to have some
elements that are historically quite accurate xi (e.g.: Gherity 1995; Skaggs 1999; Rockoff 2013), but
others that are not, despite Smith’s familiarity with the banking system that he describes(Checkland
1975a, 504-523)xii (Checkland 1975a).
Smith tells us that he favors banking because of its role in the development of Scotland: “That the
trade and industry of Scotland ... have increased considerably during this period, and that the banks
have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be doubted” (WN II.ii.41, p 297). But Smith’s
praises are qualified. It is judicious banking that is beneficial. He repeats the word several times in a
few pages. It is the “judicious operations of banking” that contribute to popular well-being and align
the self-interest of the bankers and of the merchants with society’s benefits.
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“the judicious operations of banking enable him [a dealer] to convert his dead stock into
active and productive stock; into materials to work upon, into tools to work with, and into
provisions and subsistence to work for; into stock which produces something both to
himself and to his country” (WN II.ii.86, p. 320. Emphasis added).
It is the “most judicious operations of banking” that increase productivity by, figuratively, free some
fertile fields, previously used as highways to transport goods, by moving the highways from the
ground to the air:
‘It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part of that
capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the most judicious operations
of banking can increase the industry of the country … The part of his capital which a dealer
is obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money for answering occasional
demands, is so much dead stock, which … produces nothing either to him or his country.
… The judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper in the room of a great part of
this gold and silver, enables the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active
and productive stock … The gold and silver money which circulated in any country may
very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all
the grass and corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The judicious
operations of banking, by proving, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort of
wagon-way through the air; enables the country to convert, as it were, a great part of its
highways into good pastures and corn fields, and thereby to increase very considerably the
annual produce of its land and labour.’ (WN, II.ii.86, 320-1. Emphasis added)
Banks, judicious banks that is, provide a useful service to the community and should be supported.
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That said, we cannot assume that bankers are moved by public spirit rather than self-interest. And
indeed Smith does not make that move. For Smith bankers are moved by their self interest. But their
self-interest aligns with the interest of the community and with morality—at least in the long run. If
banking is left as a competitive industry, markets will do their work of channeling self interest in the
direction of virtuous responsibility and the community’s interest through competition.
For Smith, borrowers have the tendency to over-borrow as they over-estimate their probability of
success because of the natural over-confidence in one’s good fortune that any man in reasonable
good health has. They also tend to like promissory notes more than loans in precious metals because
they free idle capital, and because they could pay back a little at a time. For Smith, bankers,
inexperienced bankers at least (see below), have incentives to over-issue paper money because they
gain from the interest on the notes. The interest on the notes is revenue to the bank. The more
notes issued, the more interest collected, the more revenue generated, and allegedly, the higher the
profits for the bank. If banks discount bills of exchange with promissory notes rather than with gold
and silver, they could make even more profit (WN II.ii.43, p. 298-9). Creditors, therefore, are
tempted to ask for over-issuing of credit, and banks are tempted to over-issue credit.
There is therefore a tendency to over-issue paper and cause crises. But if a bank over-issues, for
whatever reasons, that bank will not only fail to make profits, but it may actually fail. If a bank overissues, the extra notes will be considered as extra notes in the hands of the notes holder. Rather than
holding paper money, the merchant has incentives to go to the bank and redeem the paper money
for specie and send that specie abroad for a more fruitful investment. The bank is under obligation
to pay on demand and it will have to, unless it is willing to face a bank run which would mean the
potential for bankruptcy (WN II.ii.48, p. 301). To pay for the incoming notes the bank needs specie.
If it over-issues, that specie will not be readily available. The bank must get specie by borrowing
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from another bank, or more commonly, from London. This is expensive because of the transaction
and transportation costs and because often the rate at which it can draw from other local banks
and/or London is higher than the interest it receives from its borrowers. Indeed, “The Scotch
banks, no doubt, paid all of them very dearly for their own imprudence and inattention” (WN
II.ii.56 p. 304). This can be done on occasions, but not regularly. If it is done regularly, the bank will
eventually go out of business. Indeed that was the case of the Ayr Bank. To avoid losing profits or a
bank run, the banks learn to decrease the amount issued (WN II.ii.49-56, p. 301-304) and learn how
to be judicious.
Competition among issuers allows banks, via trial and error, to understand what allows for
individual profits and what instead leads to bankruptcy and social distress. It is this learning that
characterizes “judicious” banking and it is the competition among issuers that allows for the
development and strengthening of this judiciousness. Smith is also convinced that competition and
the risk of failure will (and did) teach bankers individual and social responsibility xiii (Cowen and
Kroszner 1994; White [1994] 1995). Moreover, if something goes wrong, the damage is more limited
because each bank is small and its failure has limited effect (WN II.ii.106, p. 329).
Once banks understand what they have “not always understood,” they will not (and did not) overissue. And because every man is driven by his desire to better his condition, there is no reason to
believe that banks will continue to “not attended to [their] own particular interest.” In fact, Smith
also observes, the learning process of banking companies leads them to innovation and to the
development of innovative institutions which promote banking stability: the establishment of the
Note Exchange is a successful example of private institutions which promote the stability and
therefore the long term development of individual banks, the banking system in general, and the well
being of the community.
7

The competition generated by a self-regulated banking system, according to Smith, generates
incentives to have a successful system of development of individual banks, the community, and
individual responsibility. Irresponsible and “greedy” bankers would paint themselves into a corner
and face the losses, up to bankruptcy, that the discipline of competition imposes. What Smith
favorably describes seems therefore to be a system of incentives generated by competitive forces
which promote the development of an ethical system and of a system of justice, based on prudence
and judiciousness. The system of credit that the competitive banking system uses, especially
regarding cash accounts, is a system that uses virtue as a signal of creditworthiness. Smith echoes
Wallace’s claim that ‘None will give credit but to men of integrity, prudence, and activity, or to men
of substance. Here then are natural checks and limits, beyond which credit will not be extended’
(Wallace [1758] 1969, 28). Chiara Baroni xiv (2002) elaborates how Smith sees a ‘man of credit’ as a
virtuous man to whom it is worth lending.
Smith had a favorable view of a system of self-regulated banks because its competitive pressures
incentivize individuals to act prudently and judiciously so that the banking system can be stable and
generate prosperity for the entire community.

Smith on Banking Regulation.
But what about regulation? After all Smith not only lauds free banking but also calls for regulation of
it, as we are often reminded by historians of economics xv (e.g.: Viner 1927; Stigler 1971). I believe
this is consistent with Smith’s focus on the wellbeing of the majority of the individuals, that is, of the
community. I show why this may be the case by looking at Smith’s reaction to regulation of notes
and coins.
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Smith favors two regulations of notes: a ban on issuing of small notes, and a ban on the ‘option
clause’, a clause that allows temporary suspension of convertibility of notes into species. In Scotland
at the time of the banking boom, there was a chronic lack of specie. The emergence of bank notes
may be seen as either an answer to the scarcity of coins, or as the cause of the scarcity of coins.
Regardless, the lack of small denomination coins was a problem, especially since wages could not be
paid in the absence of coins. Small denomination notes substitute for coins and laborers’ wages
would be paid in notes.
But, Smith points out, “where the issuing of bank notes for very small sums is allowed and
commonly practiced, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged to become bankers. A
person whose promissory note for five pounds, or even for twenty shillings, would be rejected by
every body, will get it to be received without scruple when it is issued for so small a sum as a
sixpence. But the frequent bankruptcies to which such beggarly bankers must be liable, may
occasion a very considerable inconveniency, and sometimes even a great calamity to many poor
people who had received their notes in payment” (WN II.ii.90, p. 323). Smith therefore advocates
banning notes of less than five pounds. This ban would confine notes to transactions between
dealers and dealers and not extend them to transactions between dealers and consumers. On top of
stability, this policy would, according to Smith, allow the reintroduction of coins (WN II.ii.92, p.
323).
What is interesting about this call for regulation is the distinction Smith makes between the effects
of a failure of a bank that issues large denomination notes, and of a failure of a bank that issues
small denomination notes. In the case of large denomination notes, the negative effects are limited
and the positive effects are large. In the case of small denomination notes, the opposite seems true:
if a “beggarly banker” goes bankrupt, the poor may face something like a “great calamity.” The
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protection of the poor, and, given their large number in the total population, the consequent
protection of the wellbeing and stability of society, seems therefore to take priority over a small
convenience. Smith himself says that such regulations might seem to be a
violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of natural liberty of a few individuals, which
might endanger the security of the whole society, are and ought to be, restrained by the laws
of all governments; of the most free as well as of the most despotical. The obligation to
build party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural
liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulation of the banking trade which are here
proposed.” (WN II.ii. 94, p. 324)
In addition, small denomination notes are afflicted by another problem. Especially, but not only,
with these small denomination notes there is the tendency to over-issue. Some banks accept small
denomination notes from rival banks. They may collect enough notes and then go to the issuer and
ask for their redemption all at once. The issuing bank must have enough reserve to honor the notes.
If not, the bank risks a run and failure. This has the beneficial effect to put a check on the amount
issued by each bank and to maintain the appropriate level of reserve. But it is also true that the risk
of bankruptcy increases and the consequences may become “catastrophic” for the poor. To prevent
depletion of their species reserves, banks start temporarily suspending convertibility.
Banks start issueing notes with an ‘option clause’, meaning that the bank may convert the notes back
to precious metals upon demand, but with a delay up to 6 months, while paying interest for those
months. The clause, when exercised, buys the bank time to find the precious metals it does not have
in reserve. While prima facie the option clause seems an instrument of stability, in reality it is not:
the option clause, temporarily suspending convertibility, generates instability as it dilutes the
incentive to restrain over-issuing. There is now an increased threat of bank runs. Bankers eventually
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realize it and wish to eliminate this clause. But “as voluntary agreement to ban the clause was not
possible because of the bad feelings amongst the banks, it was decided, independently by the
bankers in Edinburgh and Glasgow, that legislation should be sought to put an end to it and to the
issue of bank notes of small denomination” (Munn 1981, 19) xvi. In 1765, Parliament passed an Act
abolishing the option clause and limiting the issuing to notes above the value of 1 pound. The
implication of this is that banks had to pay their notes on demand. But while banning notes below
one pound contracted the banking system, banning of the option clause increased the popularity of
notes and allowed the system to expand. Smith supports this idea and favors the legal banning of the
option clause.
Notice that at the same time at which restrictions on the denomination of notes was proposed, the
two Scottish public banks petitioned for monopoly privileges and the extinction of the provincial
banking companies in exchange for an annual fixed payment to the Trustees for Improving Fisheries
and Manufactures. The petition failed, finding a strong opposition amongst the Scottish M.P.s. And
Adam Smith, while supporting ban of small notes and on the option clause, does not support bank
privileges in particular and monopoly privileges in general xvii (Checkland 1975): these regulations
favor a few at the expense of the majority of the people in the community.
Smith is indeed ready to criticize most of the other banking regulations because those rules help
some at the expense of many. The community not only does not benefit from them, but is actually
hurt by them. For example, Smith claims that in North America paper money does not come from
banks, but from the government. Government paper is made into legal tender. “But allowing the
colony security to be perfectly good, a hundred pounds payable fifteen years hence, for example, in a
country where interest is at six per cent. is worth little more than forty pounds of ready money. To
oblige a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for a debt of a hundred pounds actually
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paid down in ready money, was an act of such violent injustice, as has scarce, perhaps, been attempted
by the government of any other country which pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of
having originally been, what the honest and downright Doctor Douglas assures us it was, a scheme
of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors” (WN II.ii.100, p. 326. Emphasis added). Regulations
and institutional settings which favor some at the expense of many – as was also the case, for
example, in cases of sovereign coin debasement (see e.g. WN I.iv.10) -- receive strong criticism
because thought of as immoral and incentivizing immoral behaviors such as, but not limited to,
frauds.
So, it is wrong to say that Smith favors regulation of the banking system, just as it is wrong to say
that Smith favours an unregulated banking system. He favours regulation in very specific cases:
Smith favours self-imposed regulation, emerging from practice and experience, and generating
positive effects both in terms of the morality of the incentives generated and in terms of the diffused
benefits generated. He also favours government enforced-regulations for cases in which selfregulation is desired but fails to take shape, but with the consciousness that “I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good” (WN IV.ii.9, p. 456).
The two cases of regulation presented above both describe situations in which the government
intervenes to regulate something that individuals would want to have regulated because it is to their
benefit, but somehow fail to do it themselves. Banks eventually realized the option clause was not to
their benefit and wanted to eliminate it. They were not able to do it on their own because of their
history of rivalry. Small notes, similarly, are something individuals would not want, and the benefits
of eliminating them would benefit everybody in the long run, even if a few individuals would have to
bear the cost. Other regulations, which benefit a few at the expense of most, are judged as
detrimental for material and moral growth and are not supported.
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Conclusion
Economists and historians of economic thought generally think of Adam Smith as a well-rounded
thinker who cares not just about efficiency but also about justice. Yet, for some topics, they seem to
forget their own analysis and concentrate only on technical aspects of Smith. This narrowing of
focus without reference to the broader picture, has led some to see Smith as inconsistent. I use the
case of Smith’s analysis of banking to illustrate the point. My hope is that in the future, before
accusing Smith of inconsistency, we might take a closer look at his vision of the economy and of
society as integrated systems of natural liberty which promote both efficiency and justice.
When his bird’s eye view is set aside, Smith tends to be described as inconsistent: he is a vigorous
promoter of free market but also favoring a heavy regulatory hand in some parts of the economy.
But Smith’s aim seems neither to promote an unregulated market nor a government regulated one.
Smith’s major concern seems instead to be the material and moral wellbeing of the majority of the
people. He favors the institutional structure that would benefit the community the most and often
this is a mix of self-regulated and minimally government-regulated markets.
The free banking system of Scotland at his time is for Smith the most effective institutional banking
setting to promote both moral and material prosperity for the majority of the people. The
competitive discipline of many small banks which must convert notes into specie on demand
generates the incentives for a stable banking system which allows for economic development as well
as the virtues of prudence and judiciousness. Given the multiplicity of interests in society, it is
possible that those interests conflict with each other and will not reach a mutually beneficial
solution. In these cases Smith believes regulation would make society both morally better and
materially better off, as long as the regulation benefits the majority of the people, and not some at
the expense of many. Indeed, the banking and monetary regulations which create concentrated
13

benefits and dispersed costs receive strong condemnation. The banking regulations that Smith calls
for seem to be just a definition of the rules of the game which will allow competition to function at
this best. And competitive forces allow for a fruitful moral and material development of the majority
of the individuals.
Economists have taken major steps toward integrating technical issues into the big picture that
Smith offers us. I think and hope that this will be an increasing trend in the future.
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